Black America Prepares to Aid Black Africa, P. 2

"The Most Hateful War We Have Ever Fought"

"After nearly two months in Vietnam I find this the most hateful war we have ever fought . . . We find ourselves supporting a government of mandarins with little basis of popular support, fighting for an army that has little inclination to do its own fighting."

—Robert Sherrod in Life *Magazine Jan. 27.*

"Are you likely, really, to win the hearts and minds of people whose sons you have to kill before you can begin the wooing? Or the hearts and minds of peasants you uproot from their homes—and from the spiritual comfort of their ancestors' tombs . . .?"

—Gavin Young in the London Observer, *Jan. 29.*

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A Great Society for the Military-Industrial Complex

Director of the Budget Charles Schultze made a curious boast about the new budget on Congressman Frank Horton's Sunday show (Jan. 29 on Channel 13, New York). No doubt to appease conservative criticism of Johnson as a spender, Mr. Schultze said that if the costs of the Vietnamese war are excluded, it can be seen that the new fiscal 1968 budget "takes the smallest proportion of the national output of any budget since 1948." Twenty years ago the budget was 13.5% of the gross national product; this coming fiscal year, minus the cost of the Vietnam war, it will again be less than 14%. This led us to do a little arithmetic on our own. If you deduct total national defense costs in both years, you will see that we will be spending a lower percentage of the gross national product on non-military purposes in fiscal 1968 than we were 20 years ago—8.6% in 1948 but only 7.3% in 1968 (estimating GNP at $810 billion). On the other hand while "defense" took 4.6% of GNP in 1948, in the next fiscal year it will take 9.3% of GNP.

The Pentagon's Portion Doubled

So for all the talk of the Great Society, the proportion of the nation's output devoted to the Federal government's civilian activities has fallen by one-sixth while the portion devoted to war has doubled. Even these figures understate the case. Net interest payments rose from 4.2 billions to 14.2 billions in those 20 years. These are largely due to debt accumulated by war but they are included in civilian payments. So are payments to veterans, which are close to $5 billion. No matter how you look at it, civilian public needs are the stepchild of the Treasury. The revised GNP for 1948 is $243.5 billions and the unofficial expectation for 1968 is $810 billion; it has more than tripled—at least in dollar terms—in 20 years. In that same period, the expansion of population and industry has generated enormous new problems. We are polluting our air and our water, exhausting our soil and permitting a youth of desperate savagery to grow up in our decaying cities and rural slums. While private wealth is spilled away in all kinds of conspicuous and wasteful consumption, and the military eat up more and more of the Federal budget, laughably little is set aside for these public needs, despite their urgency. Ours is a spendthrift society, wasting its substance, much of it in war.

On A Small Country of 30 Million

"One of the major aerospace procurement items, which last year was glaringly deficient . . . was the iron bomb . . . McNamara said procurement of iron bombs will dominate Fiscal 1967-68 Air Force ordnance procurement. For these two years, he said, $1.4 billion will be spent on 250-lb, 500-lb, 750-lb [the last two are those carried by the B-52] and 2,000-lb bombs. Another $31 million will be spent for napalm and $463 million for 2.75 inch rockets and 20-mm ammunition . . . He said the rate of bomb production in the supplemental and in Fiscal 1968 'will provide for a rate of consumption almost equal to the total air ordnance consumed by U.S. forces in the peak year of World War 2 in Europe and almost four times the consumption in the peak year of the Korean war.'"

*—*Aviation Week *on the new budget Jan. 30.*

The Democrats have been more sensitive to these public needs than the Republicans. But the military have been the chief beneficiaries of greater Democratic readiness to spend. In the last five Eisenhower budgets, military spending rose from $43.4 to $47.6 billions. Kennedy's first military budget was $51.4, almost $4 billions higher, and Johnson's latest is $76.8, or $19 billions bigger than Eisenhower's biggest. In the seven Democratic fiscal years 1962-68 inclusive, we will have spent $63 more than we would have spent had military costs been held at the peak rate of the Eisenhower Administration. Kennedy expanded spending in every military sector from strategic nuclear weapons through conventional, down to Green Berets and preparation for bacterial war; he also launched (see page three) a campaign to export more arms abroad by gift or sales. Johnson's war in Vietnam is adding more than $40 billions to the budget in fiscal '67-'68.

The war industries never had it so good, as under the Democrats. For them it has truly been a Great Society. Neither General Dynamics nor Boeing has had to fear poverty. Profits have never been so high. Profit rates have never been higher since 1950 when the Korean war began, and the real earnings of capital are at an all-time high because depreciation allowances have been made so generous in recent years. Hubert

(*Continued on Page Four*)

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The Unexpected Militancy of A Conventional Middle Class Negro Conference

Pan-Africanism Makes Its Debut in American Domestic Politics

By Richard Thomas

The third meeting in six years of the American Negro Leadership Conference here last week-end turned into a full fledged exercise in Pan Africanism. The older, conventional, middle class Negro organizations dominated the Conference. It was held—with apt symbolism—in the Colonial Room of the Mayflower. CORE and SCLC were barely represented and SNCC not at all. ("What conference?" SNCC's Atlanta office asked when I called to inquire why it had no delegate present.) But the outstanding personality, A. Philip Randolph, in the opening address, struck a militant note. He proposed "a strong, aggressive and dedicated Negro movement" to "exercise effective and meaningful influence" on American foreign policy "in behalf of Black Africa." He called on American Negroes to give "help and hope" to black African "freedom fighters" in South Africa, Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique.

White Supremacy Also "Pan"

Meetings are no longer to be biennial. To underscore the new sense of urgency, the conference agreed to meet again in 90 days. The struggle for Southern Africa is spreading into American domestic politics. White supremacy forces, too, have become "pan-continental." The immediate focus of the struggle is Rhodesia, and the Friends of Rhodesia (white Rhodesia, that is) have become one of the most active lobbies this session on Capitol Hill. The foremost Friend in Congress, not unexpectedly, turns out to be Senator Eastland, who has already introduced a bill to recognize the Ian Smith government and lift sanctions on Rhodesia. Thus old enemies meet again on this new barricade, and the struggle for Mozambique is linked to the struggle for Mississippi.

Representatives of Ghana, Zambia and Tanzania and of Liberation movements in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Mozambique spoke at the three day session. In one of the first, Prof. St. Clair Drake of Roosevelt University, Chicago, warned that American Negroes would soon have to consider providing weapons and volunteers to these movements. Analogies were made with outside aid to the Stern Gang in Palestine and to the Irish Rebellion. One of the most moving speakers was Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, a Northwestern Ph.D., who gave up a Syracuse University Professorship to become the leader of the guerrillas in his native Mozambique. "U.S. policy toward us has steadily worsened," he told the conference. He charged that the Portugese use B-26s, "supplied by the CIA, to bomb and strafe our African villagers."

The Johnson Administration sent two speakers but both irritated the Conference. Though Randolph praised Johnson's Rhodesia policy and Ambassador Goldberg's "brilliant" answer to the foes of sanctions, Goldberg himself annoyed the conference by criticizing the "impatience" of some African leaders in the UN and suggesting the possibility of a "genuine dialogue" between Portugal and the Africans "on the principle of self-determination." Dr. Mondlane responded angrily that it was "nonsense to think that 100,000 whites in Mozambique will ever *share* power." Under Secretary of State Katzenbach stirred hostility by his effort to explain the aircraft carrier Roosevelt's call at Cape Town on its way back from Vietnam. He said it would cost an extra quarter of a million dollars to refuel the carrier at sea, and that this time (unlike 1965 when a call was cancelled) South Africa would allow Negro servicemen to go ashore. Randolph called the visit an insult to Negroes and Cleveland Robinson said a quarter million was a small price to pay "for Negroes giving their lives in this supposed fight for freedom in Vietnam."

There was criticism of the State Department for refusing a visa to the South African "colored" poet and teacher, Dennis Brutus, to visit this country on a speaking tour; he is a permanent exile. There was also sentiment for stronger action against Rhodesia. While Roy Wilkins of the NAACP kept the word "force" out of the Rhodesian resolution, it still clearly implied a desire for stronger measures. Simon Kapwepwe, Foreign Minister of Zambia, who fled to Washington for the Conference, said it was fortunate that the Wilson-Smith talks on the Tiger had broken down because Wilson's compromise would have left the whites with 50 seats in Parliament and the blacks with 17; the whites would have voted at 21, the blacks not till thirty. Rhodesia is no longer a far off country in U.S. politics.

The Need to Contain Our Own Fanaticism

"Almost everywhere in the Communist world there are forces more inclined to appreciate the values of a peaceful world . . . and there are forces less inclined. We have it in our power, by the manner in which we frame our policies, to encourage or to discourage either of these conflicting forces. International communism is thus not entirely just what we find it to be. It is in part what we make of it . . . If we fail to take account of the encouraging elements—if we act as though they did not exist and carry our differences against individual Communist powers as though we were still dealing with the naive world-revolutionary force of Lenin's day or with the grim monolith . . . that confronted us in the days of Stalin—we may be discarding the only chance that I can see to spare ourselves or our children the immeasurable catastrophe of a world war among nuclear powers."

—George Kennan to Senate Foreign Relations Jan. 30

The Senate and Bobby Baker

We have no way of knowing how much of Bobby Baker's story was true, but one part of it was unquestionable. Senator Kerr did put into the 1962 tax bill that amendment which would have cost California's three biggest savings and loan holding companies several millions a year extra in taxes. And Kerr, as the Senator in charge of the bill in conference committee two months later, did take the amendment out again when the S and L executives agreed to pay $100,000 in "campaign contributions." More important than the complicity of either man is the Senate's indifference to the implications. Even at the height of the Baker scandal two years ago it voted 62 to 25 against the Clark-Case bill to require financal disclosure by Senators and Senate employes. It shelved the subject with a Committee on Ethics under Stennis of Mississippi. This committee's fervor is indicated by its slower-than-molasses pace in dealing with the charges against Senator Dodd.

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Correspondents in the provinces north and northwest of Saigon said, however, that the highways were much more crowded than usual with U.S. convoys. Officers in the American First Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division confirmed that they were moving extraordinary amounts of food, fuel and ammunition to forward positions." *

Our Poor Helpless Military

But before the truth had thus begun to leak out, the U.S. press was treated to a tidal wave of misrepresentation about what was going on in the North. The day after Rusk's press conference, the U.S. military in Saigon pulled out all the stops. Their propagandistic purpose was faithfully mirrored in the night lead from Saigon by Alvin B. Webb, Jr., on the UPI wire Feb. 10. He cabled that "U.S. scout planes and ships Friday reported helplessly watching North Vietnam take advantage of a 4-day truce to build up their forces with massive supplies," and "American sources said the Communist 'saturation push' has all but killed hopes of extending the cease-fire." The military didn't want the cease-fire in the first place, and were afraid Johnson might somehow be drawn into peace talks. It was not surprising that U.S. officials "added," according to Webb, that "any hopes for extending the truce to allow for peace talks" had "vanished in the dust of the Communist supply convoys." One commander became so alarmed Webb reported "that he urged American planes break off their cease-fire 'stand-down' and immediately resume bombing the flood of North Vietnamese ships, trains [this was the only dispatch I saw that implied the trains were again running down the North Vietnamese panhandle] and trucks ferrying arms to South Vietnam's Communist guerrillas." One could almost see the guerrillas waving happily from the ferry slips as the boats came in.

The figures given out in Saigon on Feb. 10 produced headlines that the North Vietnamese were pouring 35,000 tons of supplies "southward" [but still, as few paused to realize, in *North* Vietnam]. The UPI that morning in its enthusiasm even said the barges and the "trucks stacked up at enemy infiltration routes . . . could handle up to 70,000 tons of supplies" but the figure on which the military settled was 35,000. By the time Saigon had to put it in writing this was reduced to 25,000 with many qualifications (see text in box at bottom of p. 2). But the press generally showed a happy capacity for ignoring the fine print. The traffic was declared to be five times heavier than "normal" but nobody stopped to point out that "normal" has been a condition of constant bombardment in which trucks and ships dared only move under cover of darkness. No American dispatch that I saw raised the question of how the military could be so sure that none of the truck and ship loads carried civilian supplies. There are 17 million people in North Vietnam and perhaps

(*Continued on Page Four*)

*** It may be that troops were also moved during the truce. The weekly casualty report issued Feb. 16 in Saigon "also showed," according to a summary in the Washington Post Feb. 17 "an addition of 2000 U.S. troops, bringing the total in Vietnam as of Feb. 11 to 412,000." That was the third day of the truce. The same communique, according to the AP ticker Feb. 16, showed that South Vietnamese forces declined that week by 3,000. They seem to desert faster than we can replace them.**

Generals as Tricky as Shyster Lawyers

Gen. Westmoreland's command hated even the word "truce" and substituted "stand-down" and "curtailment of offensive operations." These vague terms enabled the military to blur the picture and harder for the press to determine what was a violation. It helped to cover offensive patrolling sure to provoke more clashes, and it also bolstered the totals of truce "incidents." There never was a clear explanation of what constituted an "incident." At the end of the truce a U.S. spokesman said there had been 269 cease-fire "incidents" but only 86 were considered "significant." If they weren't significant, why were they counted? How insignificant could an "incident" be and still be added to the totals? In avoiding even the term "violation," almost anything could be classed as an "incident." The bigger the count the worse the truce could be made to look in the headlines back home.

Why We Had More "Incidents", Casualties and Excuses for Resumption of the Bombing

"A U.S. spokesman in Saigon said that under the truce declaration, the allies would not initiate any offensive operations. But he said because of numerous violations of previous truces, the allies assumed a 'full alert posture.' This entails increased patrol and security activity and air and naval reconnaissance, he explained."

—AP from Saigon in Wash. Star *Feb. 8 as truce began.*

"As reported by the American military it seems clear that the Vietcong were responsible for starting some incidents. In others, the nature of the allied 'full alert posture', in which patrolling is justified on the grounds of many previous cease-fire violations by the Vietcong, seems bound to be provocative. At least four of the [10] significant incidents [the first day of the truce] themselves interconnected, appeared to have resulted from patrols, close to allied perimeters, which the Vietcong can hardly be expected to recognize as 'defensive'. . . . The American military commanders are known to have great reserves about the definition of where defensive action action, which is not a violation of this bizarre truce ends and where offensive action begins."

—Its own man in Saigon London Times *Feb. 9*

"Given the nature of South Vietnamese and allied patrols, such incidents seem impossible to avoid. According to the official American account, the company, 8 miles from Bien Hoa, 'while moving to a position was contacted by an estimated enemy platoon in bunkers and trees.' By any standards that looks as if the Americans were moving and the Vietcong were static. As no further details were forthcoming from the official spokesman, no one can know why the Americans were moving there."

—Same from Saigon, Feb. 10

"In a departure from precedents established during the truces marking Christmas and the Western New Year holiday, a U.S. military spokesman yesterday disclosed that 18 American soldiers had been killed and 145 wounded in the first 40 hours of the cease-fire over the lunar New Year. . . . American sources suggested that the figures had been made public in contradiction to usual security regulations in an effort to prepare world opinion for the resumption of air strikes against North Vietnam today. One American source said, 'The word has been passed from Washington that we have to provide them with a proper rationalization."

—R. W. Apple, Jr., from Saigon, N. Y. Times *Feb. 12.*

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Nonsensical Figures the U.S. Press Swallowed Without A Grimace

(*Continued from Page Three*)

2,000,000 live in the area between the 17th and 19th parallel. Keeping them supplied under bombardment cannot be easy. Could it be that *none* of this was food and fuel for civilians? The only dispatch I saw which touched on this point was in the London *Times* Feb. 11. Its man in Saigon said the military "conceded" (apparently when he asked them) that "some of the supplies could be for civilians". "Quite a few people after all," he noted dryly, "live in the southern 'panhandle'. However," he added, "American sources are 'persuaded' they are mostly military."

The Pentagon Pleaded Ignorance

The Pentagon press office claimed it knew no more than was contained in the communique reproduced on page two, when I tried to raise these and other questions about the figures. The communique claims the sighting of 2200 trucks, though admitting nervously in two places that there may have been duplication. North Vietnam has been getting trucks from Soviet bloc sources, but that is still a lot of trucks. Total U.S. truck *and* bus exports to all of Europe East and West in 1965 was 2,752.

Most of the Soviet trucks are 2½ tons—so I learned at second hand from government sources here—some are 4 tons. How did military intelligence estimate their loads? In the U.S., where single trucks go as high as 15 tons, the average load per truck carried in 1965 (Motor Truck Facts, 1966) was only 2.65 tons. If they average two tons per load in North Vietnam they are doing miraculously well. This would mean 4400 tons carried by those 2200 trucks. Let us make it 5,000 tons to even it off. This still leaves 20,000 tons to be accounted for.

The communique says about 1570 vessels were spotted between the 17th and 19th parallel but admits that 600 were "moving north," while "approximately 970 were observed moving south." Obviously ships heading north were not carrying supplies for the guerrillas in the south. So this leaves 20,000 tons to be carried by 970 vessels. Let us round this off to 1,000 vessels, which means 20 tons per vessel. But from all I can learn most of the vessels in Vietnam are sampans which do well if they carry 500 pounds or a quarter ton. They would have to make 80 round trips in four days to deliver 20 tons. Not even MACV in Saigon claimed these sampans had speedboat motors with which to scurry up and down the 100 miles between Dong Hoi and Vinh that fast.

It turned out in addition that waterborne supply was hampered by bad weather and heavy seas. When the truce ended the U.S. command admitted there had been a "considerable decline" in the southward movement of North Vietnamese supplies but did its best to hide the cause. "This could mean," the AP from Saigon said the military explained (*St. Louis Post-Dispatch* Feb. 12), "that with extra munitions [nobody had turned up proof of munitions at all] piled up on the border [nor that any shipments had actually been spotted at any border], President Ho Chi Minh's regime did not want its trucks and boats exposed unnecessarily—loaded or empty—after Sunday's dawn" when the truce ended. It was only in Wm. Tuohy's dispatch from Saigon next day in the *Los Angeles Times* that I learned "the level of waterborne shipments down the coast of North Vietnam decreased because of high surf."

Between the high surf and the tall tales, the truth was easily lost to sight. The U.S. military—with the State Department and the White House—have never pulled off a more successful Operation Brain Wash.

Signs of De-Escalation

"We had been told by MACV [Military Assistance Command Vietnam] in November a year ago they expected about 4500 a month [infiltrated from the North]. I think perhaps they had around 5300 a month in the first 9 months. My guess, and it is only a guess, based on very fragmentary information, is that it has fallen off in the last 3 months, and I would be surprised frankly if it was much over 4500 a month for the year. [This means McNamara estimates infiltrees during the past three months at only 2100 a month.]

—McNamara to Senate Armed Services op cit. p. 68

"Instead of infiltrating units, which are substantially easier to detect and to identify than individuals, they are now infiltrating individuals. The specific number of these is hard to determine."

—McNamara at press conference Feb. 15

This issue is dedicated to my dear friend Bernard Fall who was killed by a mine in Vietnam as we were going to press.

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